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Security Information

THE COMMUNIST PEACE OFFENSIVE

1. Evidence of the past several weeks, and particularly of the past several days, would indicate that the international Communist tactic for some time to come will be to place great stress on a world-wide "peace" campaign. The purpose for such campaign is painfully obvious: by this method the Communists hope to crack the wall of resistance which the West has been constructing, and to bring about an eventual slowing-down in the armaments program of the Free World.

2. If the Communists play their cards right for a period of several years, there seems to be little question but what they will be able to meet with considerable success in accomplishing their aim. If an armistice is concluded in Korea; if a Big-Powers meeting takes place and is carried out somewhat amicably; if there is a gradual growth of trade between the Communist World and the West; and if the new Soviet Government, probably joined by the Chinese Communist Government, adopts a generally conciliatory attitude on the world scene — all of which appear likely to happen — the Western leadership will find it increasingly difficult to keep its armaments program at the present high pitch. Public opinion in itself — first in Europe and Asia, later in the United States — will simply not permit the continued expenditure of tens of billions of dollars for a military program in the light of a protracted Communist peace campaign along these lines. Though the United States Government would probably be able to sustain such a program longer than could the European powers, the interim result would be a crumbling of the Western alliance structure. The world-wide hope for peace is certain to far overshadow the fears of long-range Communist designs. The end result, of course, over the period of a decade or more would be an again defenseless West, disunited, and faced with an increasingly close-knit Communist world with a firm ability to strike when the time is ripe.

3. We must, therefore, recognize that at best — given a full-scale Soviet peace offensive — the Western armament program will suffer. Obviously, then, the present need is the drafting now of a program which can, in part, fill the gap resulting from the lessening of our defensive position vis-a-vis the Communist world; i.e., we must formulate a program which can serve as a supplement to the present defensive armaments and psychological warfare programs. At the same time, such new program must be so designed as to help to sustain for a longer period than would be the case under the present programs, at least the alliance system, if not the defense preparations, of the Free World. Finally, such new program must be so designed as to be able to take advantage of whatever slight opportunity there may be for diverting a temporary Communist tactic into a long-term Communist policy.

4. It will, of course, be up to specialists of various types to work out the details of the new program to combat the Communist peace offensive. In broad terms, however, the new program might best take the following form:

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At the first firm conciliatory sign from the Soviets or the Chinese Communists, the United States should take the leadership in the West in appearing to welcome these Communist overtures. Our immediate reply should be in the form of strong and forceful overtures of our own making. An example of such a tactic on our part would be that immediately following a meeting of the Big Powers, the United States Government should make a public declaration — giving all possible press play to the declaration — in which we invite a group of Soviet leaders to the United States, or perhaps on a tour of a number of Western countries. An alternative proposal would be to invite an exchange of delegations — businessmen, students, newspapermen, etc. — between the United States and the Soviet Union. All initial proposals, to be effective must emanate from the highest possible levels, e.g., President Eisenhower or Henry Cabot Lodge. The language used in the announcements must be sufficiently impressive and exciting as to capture the imagination of the press.

If the Soviet Union accepts such proposals, nothing will be essentially lost. Indeed, we will have won a major battle in cracking the Iron Curtain. We should then make it a prime objective to see that whatever delegation comes here is given as friendly a treatment as possible. It is simply not conceivable that if a host of delegations begins moving out of the Soviet Union to the West and is accorded such friendly treatment that all members of such delegations could long continue to "hate America."

Delegations on top official levels should be quickly followed upon by "unofficial" delegations — i.e., the town council of a cotton-weaving or steel town in the United States must invite here a delegation of leaders of a cotton-weaving or steel town in the Soviet Union, with the hope of receiving a reciprocal invitation from the Russians.

The key to this approach must, in every case, be the utilization of the widest degree of publicity to each invitation or proposal. Effective follow-ups must be planned in advance to sustain the publicity for a period of days. Such publicity would be targeted in several directions. In the first place, it would be designed to show the Soviet people our desire to be friends with them. In the second place, it would be targeted at the nations (e.g., Asian bloc) which are neither Soviet nor Western, in an effort to demonstrate our good intentions for peace. Finally, it would serve to prepare the American public for a decent reception for whatever Soviets might come here.

Suppose, on the other hand, that the Soviets refuse to send or accept delegations as proposed by us. If the publicity attending our initial proposals has been well designed and well-coordinated, then the Soviet refusal will be patent proof to the nations now in the middle of the power struggle — and to our Allies as well — that the Soviet peace campaign is not genuine, and to that degree will help to maintain (and perhaps even expand) the Western alliance system. One refusal from the Soviets should simply be a signal for us to make another

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proposal -- again giving the new proposal full publicity. Each successive Soviet refusal would only serve to reinforce beliefs throughout the Free World that the Soviets were insincere, thus giving a truly effective weapon against the Soviet peace offensive.

This type of campaign would have it all over the present Western inclination to answer Soviet overtures with a statement such as, "We are interested in seeing what they have to offer in a concrete form." Here, we would be on the offensive. We would be making a proposal which would make sense to all non-Communist peoples. The Communists would thus be placed squarely before the bar of public opinion, not just once, but again and again.

5. The same technique could, of course, be applied to Communist China. Perhaps following an armistice in Korea the first delegation could be invited from China. (Here, however, the question of U. S. diplomatic recognition of the PRC would pose a dilemma.) Once again, to the degree that Chinese Communists can participate in tours arranged by the United States Government, and to the degree that Americans can enter and travel about and talk with Chinese citizens, to that same degree will the chance of the Chinese Communist leaders taking their people into aggressive war be diminished. Conversely, each refusal upon the part of the Chinese Communists to accept an American proposal -- provided that proposal is given sufficient publicity -- would redound to our favor throughout Asia, demonstrating, beyond doubt, that the Chinese Communist intentions are not peaceful.

6. It can be argued, of course, that a new program of this type would hasten, rather than slow down, the deterioration of the Western alliance system, on the grounds that each time the Communists accepted an American proposal, they would be reinforcing in the public mind their peaceful intentions. Against this argument must be weighed several factors: (1) that by accepting such proposals the Communists are opening their citizens to Western pressures from at least two directions -- those which result from Soviet citizens traveling in the United States, and those which result from American citizens traveling in the Soviet Union. Soviet aggressive preparations would therefore also be forced to suffer. (2) That in some instances at least the Soviets may not feel that they can accept some of our offers. Each time a refusal occurs, publicity exploitation could cause a propaganda defeat for the Russians, especially in areas where the Soviet "Hate America" campaign is effective. (3) Finally, that in the absence of any new program such as this, our attempts to hold the Western alliance together will be extremely difficult at best. Through the new program we at least have an opportunity for counter-attack and offensive action of our own.

7. Certainly the above discussion does not cover all aspects of the psychological warfare program which is indicated for dealing with the new Communist tactic, and it is not meant necessarily to supplant other programs

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which may be in being or in planning. And certainly, no attempt has been made in this discussion to deal with many of the legitimate problems which arise in the implementation of such a program. It is the belief of the writers, however, that if the basic new program itself is found to have merit, the problems and difficulties can be overcome by the appropriate specialists.

The primary point to be considered is that in the waging of a peace campaign the Communists can be made to be just as vulnerable to a weakening influence as we would be, and that the means for combatting and defeating the intent of such an offensive are inherent in the nature of the offensive itself.